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Changing social contracts in climate-
change adaptation
W. Neil Adger1*, Tara Quinn2, Irene Lorenzoni2, Conor Murphy3 and John Sweeney3
Risks from extreme weather events are mediated through
state, civil society and individual action1,2. We propose evolving
social contracts as a primary mechanism by which adaptation
to climate change proceeds. We use a natural experiment
of policy and social contexts of the UK and Ireland affected
by the same meteorological event and resultant flooding in
November 2009. We analyse data from policy documents and
from household surveys of 356 residents in western Ireland and
northwest England. We find significant differences between
perceptions of individual responsibility for protection across
the jurisdictions and between perceptions of future risk from
populations directly affected by flooding events. These explain
differences in stated willingness to take individual adaptive
actions when state support retrenches. We therefore show
that expectations for state protection are critical in mediating
impacts and promoting longer-term adaptation. We argue
that making social contracts explicit may smooth pathways to
effective and legitimate adaptation.
It is clear that climate change will not be experienced as a
smooth change in mean conditions, but as a series of extreme
weather events, possibly leading to crises in policy and planning.
These can offer opportunities for investment and legislation while
there is public support and attention3,4. Understanding how
events shape the direction of adaptation requires a theory of the
process of change.
Social contract theory has a long history in political philosophy.
It explains how governments and responsibility evolve over time
as emerging risks pose challenges to the established consensus
concerning the role of the state. Social contract theory is contested:
there are profound debates on the balance of power between civil
society and the state. Recent applications suggest that adaptation
and resilience could lead to renegotiation of social contracts because
of the co-evolving nature of risks and multi-actor influences on
change5. Some theories suggest that environmental risks create new
roles for states6, but that there are limits to social contracts: they
can exclude those who may not recognize the legitimacy of govern-
ments; they can emerge from less-than-legitimate lobbying among
key actors7; and they fail to represent citizens of the future1. Climate
risks are particularly problematic for consensus building for govern-
ment because of uncertainty and uneven distribution of burdens8.
An emerging body of research suggests that the potential scale,
scope and interconnectedness of many climate-change risks will
require radical change in economic and social structures, and terms
this as transformation9,10. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change Special Report onmanaging extreme events also shows that
both incremental adaptation and transformations are required for
resilient societies11. Early indications of resistance to resettlement
and conflict in adaptation planning also highlight that populations
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directly affected will have much to say about planning into the
future12,13. Hence we conclude, in line with ref. 14, for example, that
extreme events can have significant roles in both small regulatory
changes and in large political upheavals. Renegotiations of social
contracts are therefore probably a primary mechanism for both
adaptation and transformation.
The purpose of this study is to examine the changing social
contract where the vulnerability of citizens is being altered by
changing weather extremes. Such changes happen when the
status quo is disrupted by major catastrophic events such as
floods. Previous research on flooding shows significant social
differentiation in populations vulnerable to flood risk, and
their differential access to services and insurance15,16. Across
different exposures to risk, experience of flooding has also been
demonstrated to have significant impacts on perceptions of
responsibility for action17,18.
A natural experiment of exposure to extreme flood events
occurred across Ireland and in Cumbria, northwest England in
November 2009. Of course this natural disaster occurred at a time
of significant economic crisis in both economies and a profound
renegotiation of implicit state responsibility around social protec-
tion and economicmanagement, particularly acute in Ireland.
Following on from a very wet summer in the British Isles, a
stream of Atlantic depressions moved across Britain and Ireland
through the autumn of 2009. An atmospheric river established by
mid November and became entrained in the westerly circulation19.
During the month of November in Ireland, and in particular
16–20th November in Cumbria, record-breaking rainfall was
recorded in both countries20, resulting in widespread flooding, with
property loss, economic disruption and a small number of fatalities.
Flood events in both jurisdictions were well beyond the experience
of living memory. Flooding in Cumbria has been associated with
a return period of 2,100 years21, and the flood event for the river
Suck in Ireland has been estimated as having a return period in
excess of 1,000 years22.
We designed a study to explore the success of, and changes to
social contracts following the 2009 floods in both jurisdictions.
We implemented a survey of households eight months after the
event, stratified by direct experience of flooding and adjacent
less-affected households. In addition, we documented perceptions
of government performance in dealing with the aftermath;
perceptions of fairness in response; and willingness to take action,
using a range of socio-cognitive constructs.
We also analysed policy documents and statements from
governments, flood advocacy groups andmedia reports.
The main features of social contracts associated with flood risk
in Ireland and England are outlined in Table 1, based on the
documentary analysis. They differ in subtle but significant ways: by
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Legislation addressing flood risk and response is framed by
the Flood and Water Management Act (enacted in 2010 after
the floods) CCA (2004).
Legislation addressing flood risk is framed by the Review of
National Flood Policy 2002–2004 and the Framework for
Emergency Management 2006.
Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA) outlines national policy.
Office for Public Works is the lead agency for coordinating
flood risk management with particular focus on risk reduction
and work programmes.
The Environment Agency (EA) is responsible for flood forecasting
and warning. It operates its own flood defence infrastructure.
The Department of Environment, Community and Local
Government.
Planning Policy Statement 25 (PPS 25) gives the EA a role in
determining planning permission in flood risk areas.
• Develop planning guidelines and development control.
Local Authorities: Local Authorities:
• Implement flood management works. • Responsible for operating and maintaining flood
forecasting and warning.
• Manage planning permission and therefore development in
flood risk areas (in line with Planning Policy Guidance 25).
• Manage planning permission and therefore development
in flood risk areas.
• Liaise with Local Resilience Forums on emergency
planning.
• Develop and coordinate emergency response (with Health
services and Gardai).
• Responsible for providing emergency shelter and food
post-floods.
The role of the
private sector
Insurance sector: Agreement between government and
insurance sector (see text and below). At present, there are
negotiations for coverage beyond 2013.
Insurance sector: Flood cover governed by market forces.
Voluntary sector The roles of voluntary organizations are formally integrated
into civil protection through the Voluntary Sector Civil Service
Forum. At national level, groups with vested interest can
lobby for change: for example, the Royal Society for the
Protection of Birds (RSPB), Wildlife trusts, flood action
groups. At the local level voluntary groups work with local
government on flood risk planning; during a flood voluntary
groups work with responders on warning and evacuation
(Royal National Lifeboat Institution, RNLI); and post floods
provide individuals with assistance (financial, legal)—as did
flood actions groups and the Red Cross in Cumbria.
At national level, groups with vested interest can lobby for
change: for example RSPB, Wildlife trusts, flood action
groups, Irish Farmers Associations, Business Associations.
Post-floods humanitarian aid is distributed by the
Department of Social and Family Affairs and through the Irish
Red Cross and community welfare workers. The Department
of Agriculture and Food provides assistance for farmers.
Individual capacity Homeowners can: Homeowners can:
• Obtain flood insurance if the risk of flooding is no worse
than 1 in 75 annual probability of flooding (subject to
change in 2013).
• Obtain flood insurance but there are not laws or protocols
obligating insurance companies to provide insurance.
• Make changes to their property to reduce the risk of
flooding.
• Make changes to their property to reduce the risk of
flooding.
• Move away from a flood risk area. • Move away from a flood risk area.
• Participate in consultation processes regarding planning
and flood defences.
• Participate in consultation processes regarding planning
and flood defences.
Individuals: can join local interest groups, contribute to
fund-raising efforts, join charities, lobby councillors and
members of parliament.
Individuals: can join local interest groups, contribute to
fund-raising efforts, or join charities, lobby councillors and
members of parliament.
themechanisms bywhich representation occurs, the responsibilities
devolved to individuals, and in government intervention in
insurance markets. In England, the legislative setting for the social
contract related to flooding sits in a much wider context of civil
protection and management; for example, emergency planning
and response is set out in the Civil Contingency Act (CCA) of
2004 (see Table 1). This context affects how individuals perceive
responsibility and demand change when events occur.
The survey results indicate that it is primarily the differing
contexts across jurisdictions that bear a significant influence on the
evolution of the social contract. Independently of direct experience
of flooding, householders expect government to be responsible
for reducing future flood occurrence (Z = 14.15, p < 0.001),
although householders were also ascribed some responsibility,
significantly more in Cumbria than in Galway (χ2 = 20.49,
p< 0.001; see Fig. 1a).
We find contrasting evidence on the influence of direct
experience of flooding on individuals’ perceptions of future risk and
responsibility to act. Overall, very similar proportions of flooded
and non-flooded respondents in Cumbria believed, or did not
believe respectively, that they would experience a similar event
in the next five years (χ2 = 0.20, p > 0.05). The difference was
considerably starker in Galway: those who had experienced direct
flooding were significantly more likely to believe they would be
affected by flooding again, in comparison with those who had not
been flooded (Fig. 1b; χ2=39.32, p<0.001).
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Figure 1 | Impact of flood experience across Galway (Ireland) and
Cumbria (England) on perceptions of responsibility, risk and motivations
for adaptation. a, The percentage of respondents (both flooded and
non-flooded) that agreed or strongly agreed that action to reduce the
likelihood of flooding is the responsibility of homeowners or Government
(n= 356). b, The percentage of respondents who said that they thought
they were likely to experience flooding in their local area in the next five
years (n= 356). c, Of the people that had been flooded and who believed
that they would be flooded in the next five years (Galway n= 53, Cumbria
n=42) the percentage who agreed or strongly agreed that: ‘I feel it should
be my duty to take more responsibility if the risk of flooding increases’; ‘I
would consider making changes to my house to prevent flood damage to
give me peace of mind’ and that ‘I would consider making changes to my
house to save on my insurance bill’.
Of those who had experienced flooding and believed they would
be affected again in the foreseeable future, Cumbrians indicated a
stronger sense of personal duty and willingness to adapt through
modification of their homes (χ2=3.62, p<0.05; for peace of mind
as well as for insurance) thanGalway respondents (Fig. 1c).
There are significant differences in perceptions of fairness in its
dimensions of fair outcome and fair process. When asked whether
respondents agreed that everyone in their community received the
same level of flood protection before November 2009, 45% of
respondents in Galway agreed that they had and in Cumbria 32%
of respondents agreed (χ2= 5.05, p< 0.05). Following the flood,
not all households were treated equally. When asked if everyone in
their community had received help promptly following the flood,
74% of respondents in Cumbria agreed, but in Galway less than
half of respondents agreed with this statement (44%; χ2= 44.12,
p < 0.001). With regards to the allocation of resources, 74% of
respondents in Cumbria felt resources had been distributed to those
who needed them the most, and again, in Galway this number was
smaller with 56% agreeing (χ2=10.19, p<0.01).
In Galway authorities were deemed to be falling short of the
responsibilities expected by their citizens as part of the social
contract, resulting in a sense of helplessness among sections of the
population. This helplessness is then manifest in an unwillingness
to take personal responsibility for flood protection. Reliance on
charitable organizations, outside the formal humanitarian aid
provided, was a source of government-directed anger from many
Galway respondents and seen as a failure of government tomeet the
needs of themost vulnerable. The government’s response in Ireland
has been widely critiqued, fostering resentment and leading to
litigation: affected Irish citizens initiated legal proceedings against
authorities23,24. Liability has not been so critically contested in
Cumbria where there are processes to help ensure that charitable
organizations work with formal institutions both during and
following flood events (such as Cumbria’s Council for Voluntary
Services)25. Actions taken by services on behalf of and funded
by government, however, were not necessarily perceived as help
from the state. To some extent, government action may be
camouflaged by different interpretations on lines of command.
Hence, perceptions of responsibility, even if they deviate from the
policy landscape, are important in how individuals experience and
negotiate the social contract.
Cumbrians surveyed, in contrast, manifest greater resilience in
the face of recurrent adversity. This seems to stem as a response
to previous experience of dealing with flooding in the context of a
peculiar—but rapidly evolving—social contract. In otherwords, the
relationship between past and recent experiences of flooding and
their management, through significant past policy developments
(for example, the Pitt Report26, government’s response to the
2007 floods) as well as imminent changes, is reflected in their
willingness to adapt.
Context is therefore crucial. The expectations of present and
future social contracts influence perceptions and behaviours;
concurrently, social contracts develop in response to the specific
jurisdictional circumstances in which they apply.
We find that adaptation options for changing risks are mediated
by the social contract between state and citizen in every risk
context. This means that vulnerable communities, where possible,
use the means of political representation to create change that
deals with the risks. At present, the government and insurance
sector in England are renegotiating significant changes to flood
insurance cover related to public management. A move towards
risk-sensitive insurance would represent a significant development
of the social contract, in terms of responsibility for adaptation
between state, market and individuals but could also alter the
profile of moral hazard (given that public consultation induces
government emphasis on the more vulnerable that voice their
concerns)27,28. Such developments may lead to unjust outcomes:
underpinning these discussions are tensions extant in the English
context, where millions already inhabit areas prone to flooding.
Were flood insurance to become unavailable or unaffordable,
relocation to low-risk areas may be curtailed for those with limited
resources and choice29.
Where underlying economic structures shape risk and respon-
sibilities, adaptation is a contested process constituted by a series
of related but not concatenated events. Fairness, blame and liability
therefore become dominant discourses among citizens who may be
made more vulnerable by shifts in responsibility of states. We find
in particular, that the expectation of the social contract on flood
risk was breached in Ireland as a result of the 2009 floods, but is
unlikely in either England or Ireland to be renegotiated to enshrine
long-term resilience, given constraints on public sector financing of
key agencies in both countries. Although individual extreme events,
such as the floods in Cumbria or Galway, cannot solely be ascribed
to a climate-change influence, there is increasing evidence for a
higher likelihood of more precipitation extremes due to anthro-
pogenic warming30. Hence, we argue that climate-change adapta-
tion is likely to proceed as a series of crises that are likely to disrupt
planning and adaptation processes as instant solutions are sought.
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This study sets an agenda for researching renegotiation of social
contracts between citizens and states as a primary mechanism for
adaptation. There are benefits to expanding methods in this area
beyond detecting and forensically examining evolving contracts
towards, for example, action-oriented research to provide platforms
for transformative action with communities and political processes.
This study also points to the fundamental importance of specific
events as threshold elements in turning incremental adaptation
into transformational change. Such thresholds are likely to be
detected in many climate-change risks. If social contracts can be
fruitfully negotiated through enhancing collective responsibility
and citizenship, adaptation is likely to advance more smoothly and
at less real cost to vulnerable groups.
Methods
We developed a survey and piloted it in the study areas in June and July 2010 in
Ireland and in September 2010 in Cumbria. The main survey was administered
face-to-face with individuals from households who had either directly experienced
(at their place of residence at the time) flooding or not experienced flooding in
November 2009, in selected geographical areas: during 9–23 August 2010 in Galway
(west Ireland) in Ballinasloe, Claregalway, Athenry and Gort; and 18–30 September
2010 in Cumbria (northwest England) in Keswick, Cockermouth, Braithwaite
and Workington. The questionnaire used was identical in both regions, with the
exception of references to location-specific organizations and agencies.
Respondents were stratified into flooded and non-flooded areas, and surveyed
every third house in randomly selected roads (with the exception of smaller
settlements in Ireland where, owing to the small numbers of households flooded,
every house was approached), at different times during the day. No-response
households (or individuals who indicated interest in participating in the survey but
were otherwise engaged at the time) received a paper copy of the survey that was
collected later by the research team. A maximum of one interview with an adult per
address was undertaken. Each interview took approximately 20min to complete.
No incentives for participation were offered.
In analysing the differences between locations and groups, we conducted
non-parametric tests including Chi-squared (χ2) to examine the differences
between groups (flooded/non-flooded and Galway/Cumbria) and the Wilcoxon
signed rank test (Z ) to test within groups in the survey. The significance of all
results was assessed at the 0.05 level.
Received 19 July 2012; accepted 19 October 2012; published online
25 November 2012
References
1. O’Brien, K., Hayward, B. & Berkes, F. Rethinking social contracts: Building
resilience in a changing climate. Ecol. Soc. 14, 12 (2009).
2. Adger, W. N. et al. Are there social limits to adaptation to climate change?
Climatic Change 93, 335–354 (2009).
3. IPCCManaging the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate
Change Adaptation: Summary for Policymakers (eds Field, C. B. et al.)
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012).
4. Johnson, C. L., Tunstall, S. M. & Penning-Rowsell, E. C. Floods as catalysts for
policy change: Historical lessons from England and Wales.Wat. Res. Dev. 21,
561–575 (2005).
5. O’Brien, K. Global environmental change II: From adaptation to deliberate
transformation. Prog. Human Geogr. 36, 667–676 (2012).
6. Dryzek, J. S. et al. Environmental transformation of the state: The USA,
Norway, Germany and the UK. Polit. Stud. 50, 659–682 (2002).
7. Weale, A. Newmodes of governance, political accountability and public reason.
Gov. Oppos. 46, 58–80 (2011).
8. Pelling, M. Adaptation to Climate Change: From Resilience to Transformation
(Routledge, 2011).
9. Kates, R. W., Travis, W. R. & Wilbanks, T. J. Transformational adaptation
when incremental adaptations to climate change are insufficient. Proc. Natl
Acad. Sci. USA 109, 7156–7161 (2012).
10. Park, S. E. et al. Informing adaptation responses to climate change through
theories of transformation. Glob. Environ. Change 22, 115–126 (2012).
11. O’Brien, K. et al. in Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters
to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (eds Field, C. B. et al.) 437–486
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012).
12. De Sherbinin, A. et al. Preparing for resettlement associated with climate
change. Science 334, 456–457 (2011).
13. Few, R., Brown, K. & Tompkins, E. Climate change and coastal management
decisions: Insights from Christchurch Bay, UK. Coast. Manag. 35,
255–270 (2007).
14. Pelling, M. & Dill, K. Disaster politics: Tipping points for change in the
adaptation of sociopolitical regimes. Prog. Human Geogr. 34, 21–37 (2010).
15. Tapsell, S. M., Penning-Rowsell, E. C., Tunstall, S. M. & Wilson, T. L.
Vulnerability to flooding: Health and social dimensions. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A
360, 1511–1525 (2002).
16. Walker, G. & Burningham, K. Flood risk, vulnerability and environmental
justice: Evidence and evaluation of inequality in a UK context. Crit. Soc. Policy
31, 216–240 (2011).
17. Harvatt, J., Petts, J. & Chilvers, J. Understanding householder responses to
natural hazards: Flooding and sea-level rise comparisons. J. Risk Res. 14,
63–83 (2008).
18. Whitmarsh, L. Are flood victims more concerned about climate change than
other people? The role of direct experience in risk perception and behavioural
response. J. Risk Res. 11, 351–374 (2008).
19. Lavers, D. A. et al. Winter floods in Britain are connected to atmospheric rivers.
Geophys. Res. Lett. 38, L23803 (2011).
20. Walsh, S. Report on Rainfall of November 2009 Climatological Note No. 12
(Met Éireann, 2010); available via http://go.nature.com/OfxYaY
21. Miller, J. D., Kjeldsen, T. R., Hannaford, J. & Morris, D. G. A hydrological
assessment of the November 2009 floods in Cumbria, UK Hydrol. Res. (in the
press, 2012); available at http://www.iwaponline.com/nh/up/nh2012076.htm.
22. HydroEnvironmental Ltd. Ballinasloe Flood Relief Study Report No. 628-v1.3
(HydroEnvironmental, 2010).
23. Cahill, A. Flooding victims take compensation case to Europe The Irish
Examiner (14 April 2011); available at http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/
kfojkfeyausn/rss2/
24. Jeffers, J. M. The Cork City flood of November 2009: Lessons for flood risk
management and climate change adaptation at the urban scale. Irish Geogr. 44,
61–80 (2011).
25. Riding, K. The Role of the Third sector in Helping Communities in Cumbria
Recover from the November 2009 Floods (Cumbria Voluntary Services, 2012).
26. Pitt, M. The Pitt Review: Lessons Learned from the 2007 Floods (Cabinet Office,
London, 2008); available via http://go.nature.com/clZHXO
27. Johnson, C. L. & Priest, S. J. Flood risk management in England: A changing
landscape of risk responsibility? Int. J. Wat. Res. Dev. 24, 513–525 (2008).
28. Harries, T. & Penning-Rowsell, E. Victim pressure, institutional inertia and
climate change adaptation: The case of flood risk. Glob. Environ. Change 21,
188–197 (2011).
29. Pryce, G., Chen, Y. & Galster, G. The impact of floods on house prices: An
imperfect information approach with myopia and amnesia. Housing Stud. 26,
259–279 (2011).
30. Coumou, D. & Rahmstorf, S. A decade of weather extremes. Nature Clim.
Change 2, 491–496 (2012).
Acknowledgements
We thank S. Harrigan and S. Keogh for research assistance; the Tyndall Centre for
Climate Change Research for financial support; and S. O’Neill, P. Devine-Wright,
M. Boyle and R. Kitchin for constructive comments. This version remains our
own responsibility.
Author contributions
W.N.A. and I.L. conceived the study. W.N.A., I.L., T.Q. C.M. and J.S. designed the study.
C.M. andT.Q. implemented the survey. All authors contributed towriting the paper.
Additional information
Reprints and permissions information is available online at www.nature.com/reprints.
Correspondence and requests formaterials should be addressed toW.N.A.
Competing financial interests
The authors declare no competing financial interests.
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE | VOL 3 | APRIL 2013 | www.nature.com/natureclimatechange 333
© 2013 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved
